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SPECIAL EDUCATION DUE PROCESS HEARING 
REQUESTS UNDER IDEA: 
A HEARING SHOULD NOT ALWAYS BE REQUIRED 
Timothy E. Gilsbach* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(“IDEA”),1 the parents of a student who qualifies for the IDEA’s 
protections may file a request for an impartial due process 
hearing when they disagree “with respect to any matter related 
to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of 
the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public 
education.”2  Such hearings, even when the school entity wins 
the entire case, can be costly both for the educational entity, in 
terms of its own legal fees and time spent by staff in a hearing 
room rather than in a classroom educating children, and the 
state system tasked with hearing these case if a full blown 
hearing is unnecessarily required.3  Not surprisingly, the filing 
of a special education due process hearing request or complaint 
under the IDEA often results in a hearing.  In fact, the IDEA 
specifically provides that the parties “shall have an opportunity 
for an impartial due process hearing.”4  Likewise, some states 
have similar provisions in their administrative code that 
appear to require a hearing on the merits rather than 
 
*Associate with King, Spry, Herman, Freund & Faul, LLC in Bethlehem, 
Pennsylvania.  J.D., The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law 
(2004), B.A., Messiah College (2000).  Mr. Gilsbach focuses his practice on representing 
school districts, charter schools and other educational entities in the litigation of 
special education matters in administrative due process hearings and in federal court. 
 1  20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2005). 
 2  20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A) (2005); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a)(2006).  In 
addition, a school district or other educational entity may, under certain circumstances, 
file a request for an impartial due process hearing.  Id. It is important to note that 
parents are typically the filing party in a special education due process hearing. 
 3  See Sasha Pudelski, Rethinking Special Education Due Process: AASA IDEA 
Re-Authorization Proposals: Part 1 (Apr. 2013)(noting costs, both financial and 
otherwise, incurred by school districts through due process hearings). 
 4  20 U.S.C. §1415(f)(1)(A) (2005) (emphasis added). 
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permitting pre-hearing dispositive motions.5  However, 
whether due to specific issues raised or a backlog of cases, a 
trend has emerged among the hearing officers tasked with 
deciding these cases, to dismiss some of these complaints 
without a hearing. For the following reasons, this trend should 
be permitted and expanded in the same way as pre-trial 
dispositive motions have been in other areas of the law in order 
to allow for an efficient and cost saving means of addressing 
cases that do not require a full hearing. 
At present, it appears that there are three basic categories 
for these types of cases: (1) special education due process cases 
in which it is permissible under the language of the IDEA itself 
to dismiss a hearing request without a hearing; (2) cases in 
which hearing officers have, with the approval of the federal 
courts, dismissed special education due process complaints 
despite a lack of clear language in the IDEA authorizing such 
action; and (3) cases in which the dismissal of the complaint 
without a hearing is deemed impermissible. It should be noted 
that the last species of case are cases decided wholly on fact-
specific scenarios and do not, therefore, establish that a 
hearing is always required under the IDEA. 
II. DISMISSAL WITHOUT A HEARING IS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED 
FOR UNDER IDEA IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES 
Although the IDEA is unclear as to whether a hearing must 
be held in these types of cases, there are several specific 
provisions in the IDEA that permit a hearing officer to dismiss 
a case without a hearing. For example, the IDEA explicitly 
allows for the dismissal of a complaint due to (1) the failure of 
the parents to participate in the mandatory resolution session, 
or (2) an insufficient complaint based upon the standards 
articulated in the IDEA. 
 
 5  See, e.g., 22 PA. CODE §14.162(f) (2001).  It should be noted that there 
continues to be some dispute as to whether or not state administrative codes apply in 
these types of hearings, which are typically held by state agencies applying both 
federal and state law.  However, to the extent that they are applicable, state 
regulations in some jurisdictions raise additional questions as to whether or not a 
hearing must be held. 
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A. Failure to Participate in a Resolution Session as Basis for 
Dismissal 
The hearing officer is empowered to dismiss the complaint 
when the child’s parents file a due process hearing request but 
fail or otherwise refuse to participate in a mandatory resolution 
session with the local school entity and the school does not 
waive the resolution process.6  It is unclear if such a dismissal 
is with or without prejudice, although dismissals of this type 
are typically done without prejudice.7  While this mechanism 
may serve to address passive parents, the procedural hoops 
that the school district or Local Educational Agency (“LEA”)8 
must jump through to have the motion granted makes this 
option of limited practical use, as the parents may simply file 
again without forfeiting any claims.9 
B. Insufficient Complaint as Basis for Dismissal 
The other provision of the IDEA that permits the dismissal 
of claims on the basis of an insufficient complaint is of far more 
value to school districts because it may lead to an outright 
dismissal of the complaint with prejudice or lead to a more 
specific pleading by the parents, providing the LEA with more 
information about the dispute. The provision allows for the 
hearing officer to dismiss the complaint, order the filing of an 
amended complaint that provides more details of the 
allegations against the school district or deny the sufficiency 
challenge.10  The IDEA provides that a school district may 
challenge the sufficiency of the complaint within fifteen days of 
 
 6  34 C.F.R. § 300.510(b)(4) (2006); Marinette Sch. Dist., 107 LRP 8221 (Wis. 
SEA, Feb. 14, 2007); Kansas City Mo. 33 Sch. Dist., 109 LRP 61302 (Mo. SEA, Aug, 4, 
2008); Summer City Bd. of Educ., 109 LRP 66470 (N.J. SEA, Apr. 9, 2008); In re: 
Student with a Disability, 111 LRP 9103 (W.Va. SEA, Dec. 14, 2010).  It is important to 
note that prior to seeking dismissal the school district must make reasonable efforts to 
get the parents to participate in the resolution session and document those efforts; see 
also 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(b)(4) (2006). 
 7  See Marinette Sch. Dist., 107 LRP 8221; Kansas City Mo. 33 Sch. Dist., 109 
LRP 61302; Summer City Bd. of Educ., 109 LRP 66470; In re: Student with a 
Disability, 111 LRP 9103; Perry A. Zirkel, Impartial Hearings Under the IDEA: Legal 
Issues and Answers (2010). 
 8  The IDEA refers to the concept of a Local Educational Agency (“LEA”), which 
may be a school district, charter school or other educational entity. See 20 U.S.C. § 
1401(19)(2005).  Throughout this article the term school district will be used, but would 
include all LEA’s. 
 9  See 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(b)(4) (2006). 
 10  See 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(d)(2006). 
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receipt of the complaint.11  While most complaints are deemed 
sufficient in terms of most of the IDEA’s requirements,12 there 
is much debate about what is required to be sufficient in 
identifying the nature of the problem, “including facts related 
to the problem.”13 
Decisions on this issue have taken differing views as to how 
this requirement is met.  One court has opined that the IDEA’s 
requirements “impose ‘minimal pleading standards’ on the 
parties.”14  However, another court has taken the position that 
the IDEA requires more than a “bare notice pleading.”15 The 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, “the purpose of 
the statute to foster cooperation between the parents and 
educational agency is served by a development of the factual 
basis for the dispute prior to the initiation of adversarial 
proceedings.”16 The court ultimately found that merely alleging 
the nature of the problem, without including the facts to 
support the claim, was not sufficient.17  Moreover, the 
legislative intent of the sufficiency requirements is “to ensure 
that the other party, which is generally the school district, will 
have an awareness and understanding of the issues forming 
the basis of the complaint.”18 
It is clear under the IDEA that a school district may insist 
that factual allegations be more specific and, if not specific, the 
 
 11  20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(2) (2005); 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(d) (2006). 
 12  The IDEA and its applicable regulations require that the Due Process 
Complaint include the name of the child, address of residence, a description of the 
nature of the problem, and a proposed resolution. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(7)(A)(ii) (2005). 
 13  34 C.F.R. § 300.508(b)(5) (2006); see also Pottstown Sch. Dist. 110 LRP 68536 
(Pa. SEA, Oct. 3, 2010); Cent. York Sch. Dist., 111 LRP 16560 (Pa. SEA, Sept. 25 2010); 
Norwalk Bd. of Educ. 110 LRP 57855 (Conn. SEA, Sept. 1, 2010); Farmington Bd. of 
Educ., 110 LRP 32033 (Conn. SEA, May 5, 2010); Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 110 LRP 
32037 (Conn. SEA, Apr. 28, 2010); Wallingford-Swarthmore Sch. Dist., 110 LRP 40319 
(Pa. SEA, Feb. 20, 2010); Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 109 LRP 68049 (Conn. SEA, Sept. 15, 
2009); Hartford Bd. of Educ., 109 LRP 61407 (Conn. SEA, Aug. 24, 2009); Peoria Sch. 
Dist. 150, 109 LRP 57501 (Ill. SEA, Mar. 24, 2009); Greenwich Bd. of Educ., 111 LRP 
17391 (Conn. SEA, Nov. 7, 2009) (explaining insufficient factual pleading of the nature 
of the problem and the facts to support the same as the basis for most sufficiency 
challenges). 
 14  Alexandra R. v. Brookline Sch. Dist., No. 06-cv-0215-JL, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 83481, at *16 (D.N.H. Sept. 10, 2009) (citing Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 54 
(2005)). 
 15  M.S.G. v. Lenape Regional High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 306 Fed. Appx. 772, 
774 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 16  Id. at 722 (citing Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 53). 
 17  Id. at 744. 
 18  S. Rep. No. 108–85, at 28 (2003). 
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school may seek to have the complaint dismissed or a court 
order instructing the parents to file a more specific complaint. 
Both methods are beneficial to the school district and should be 
used more regularly as a method of having a case dismissed or 
obtaining more facts about the filing parties’ allegations. Such 
requests often garner some response from the filing party, 
which are often beneficial to the responding party, including 
more factual averments as to the nature of the problem and the 
supporting facts. Hearing officers will typically allow a filing 
party to amend its complaint if the original complaint is found 
to be insufficient, but only within a set period of time.19  
However, at least one federal court has held that a hearing 
officer’s dismissal of the complaint on sufficiency grounds 
cannot be appealed.20  Thus, the use of this mechanism can 
often be fruitful and should be employed more widely as a 
means to either have a complaint dismissed or to narrow the 
issues for hearing in order to try and resolve the matter or to 
expedite the hearing process. 
Accordingly, the IDEA, by expressly providing for the 
dismissal of some due process complaints without a hearing, 
cannot be read as requiring a hearing in every case, and it is 
submitted that these tools provided for under the IDEA should 
be used more frequently by LEAs. 
III. DISMISSAL HAS BEEN PERMITTED IN A VARIETY OF CASES 
THAT DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE SPECIFIC STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS, AN AREA THAT SHOULD BE EXPANDED 
While many of the cases in which hearing officers have 
dismissed complaints prior to a hearing appear to involve 
unique factual situations that would lend themselves to this 
type of pre-hearing dismissal, it is clear that many hearing 
officers and federal courts believe such a procedure is 
permissible under the IDEA. Unlike other areas of the law 
where discovery is provided for, many cases under the IDEA, 
 
 19  See, e.g., Pottstown Sch. Dist. 110 LRP 68536 ; Cent. York Sch. Dist., 111 
LRP 16560; Norwalk Bd. of Educ. 110 LRP 57855; Farmington Bd. of Educ., 110 LRP 
32033; Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 110 LRP 32037; Wallingford-Swarthmore Sch. Dist., 110 
LRP 40319; Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 109 LRP 68049; Hartford Bd. of Educ., 109 LRP 
61407; Peoria Sch. Dist. 150, 109 LRP 57501; Greenwich Bd. of Educ., 111 LRP 17391. 
 20  Knight v. Wash. Sch. Dist., 110 LRP 27769 (E. D. Mo. 2010), affirmed, 56 
IDELR 189 (8th Cir. 2010). 
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for which there is no pre-hearing discovery, can only be 
dismissed based upon undisputed facts included in the 
pleadings at the administrative level, with the presumption 
that even if the alleged facts are true, the claim fails as a 
matter of law.  Such motions often relate to issues such as the 
jurisdiction of the hearing officer to hear certain types of 
claims, the lack of standing on the part of one of the parties, or 
a failure to plead sufficient facts, rather than the substantive 
issue of whether a student was denied a free and appropriate 
public education (“FAPE”) which normally must have a hearing 
to create a factual record.  However, as the examples below 
illustrate, it appears there is a certain level of creativity in 
these types of motions as the approach has not always been 
limited to specific factual patterns. 
A. Issue Preclusion 
One example of dismissals found to be proper are cases 
involving claim or issue preclusion. These cases typically 
involve a review of the two complaints, the one filed in the 
current matter and the one filed in the prior matter, and are 
perhaps the simplest to resolve given that they typically 
involve a review of the prior case to determine if the issues 
raised in the current case were or could have been raised in the 
prior one.21 In the cases of IDEA Public Charter School v. 
Belton, No. 05-467, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52042 (D.D.C Jul. 
19, 2007), and Patricia P. v. Board of Education of Oak Park, 8 
F. Supp. 2d 801 (N.D. Ill. 1998), the hearing officer found that 
claim preclusion would permit the dismissal of previously 
raised claims.22 A review of the claims raised in the two cases 
revealed, however, that the claims in the two matters were not 
the same and the claim raised in the second matter was not 
barred by claim preclusion.23  In other cases, hearing officers 
have found that the same claims were essentially being 
reasserted in the second matter as the first and, therefore, the 
 
 21  See, e.g., IDEA Pub. Charter Sch. v. Belton, No. 05-467, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 52042 (D.D.C. Jul. 19, 2007); Patricia P. v. Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park, 8 F. Supp. 
2d 801 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Indep. Sch. Dist. of Boise, No. 1, 111 LRP 23776 (Idaho SEA, 
Feb. 1, 2011); In re: T.B., 111 LRP 6399 S (Pa. SEA, Nov. 11, 2010); In re: Student with 
a Disability, 57 IDELR 179 (N.Y. SEA, July 28, 2011); Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 
111 LRP 51787 (Id. SEA, (July 1, 2011)); In re: Student with a Disability, 111 LRP 
9103. 
 22  Belton, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52042; Patricia P., 8 F. Supp 2d. at 801. 
 23  Id. 
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claims could be dismissed without a hearing.24  Typically, the 
hearing officer needs a copy of the complaint and/or decision in 
the last case, if a different hearing officer handled the review.25 
This type of motion can often be used to dismiss claims in 
which a party repeatedly files for due process. 
B. Lack of Jurisdiction 
Complaints have also been dismissed that have been found 
to be outside the jurisdiction of a hearing officer. Some 
examples include claims for the enforcement of settlement 
agreements or claims that center on matters not related to 
special education.  In the area of settlement agreements, 
jurisdictions are split as to whether or not hearing officers have 
authority to resolve such claims.26  Ample authority suggests, 
however, that complaints predicated on a breach of a 
settlement agreement should be dismissed prior to the hearing 
because the hearing officer lacks jurisdiction over the claim.27 
Claims not related to special education are also frequently 
dismissed, and include, inter alia, claims of discrimination due 
to race, tort claims, and violations of other federal statutes.28  
 
 24  Independent Sch. Dist. of Boise, No. 1, 111 LRP 23776; In re: T.B., 111 LRP 
6399; In re: Student with a Disability, 57 IDELR 179; In re: Student with a Disability, 
111 LRP 9103. 
 25  Independent Sch. Dist. of Boise No. 1,111 LRP 23776; In re: Student with a 
Disability, 57 IDELR 179; In re: Student with a Disability, 111 LRP 9103. 
 26  Upland Unified Sch. Dist., 111 LRP 13468 (Cal. SEA 2007120214, Feb.17, 
2011) (noting a lack of clarity as to whether a special education hearing officer has 
authority to resolve disputes regarding the enforcement of a settlement agreement); 
Wallingford-Swarthmore Sch. Dist., 110 LRP 26499 (Pa. SEA Mar. 14, 2010)(same); 
Monson Pub. Sch., 110 LRP 49101 (Mass. SEA, (Aug. 23, 2010))(noting differing views 
on this issue). 
 27  L.M. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 10-4855, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1999 
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2011); Petersen v. Cal. Special Educ. Hearing Office, No. C 07-2400 
SI, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58532 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2008); Linda P. v. Hawaii, No. 05-
00585 SOM-KSC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52096 (D. Haw. July 25, 2006); Monson Pub. 
Sch., 110 LRP 49101; New Britain Bd. of Educ., 110 LRP 57871 (Conn. SEA, Jul. 26, 
2010); In re: Student with a Disability, 111 LRP 16554 (Pa. SEA, Jun. 5, 2010). 
 28  See, e.g., Old Rochester Pub. Sch., 111 LRP 66082 (Mass. SEA, Oct. 7, 2011) 
(finding that the hearing officer lacked authority to order district to take specific action 
with respect to a teacher); Springfield Pub. Sch., 111 LRP 26774 (Mass. SEA, Apr. 12, 
2011) (concluding that the hearing officer lacks authority to order that district provide 
parent with counsel for Due Process Hearing); Boston Pub. Schs., 111 LRP 32124 
(Mass. SEA, Apr. 4, 2011) (holding that the hearing officer does not have authority to 
rule on systematic complaints about school district’s special education system); Irvine 
Unified Sch. Dist., 111 LRP 6893 (Cal. SEA, Jan. 20, 2011) (finding that the hearing 
officer lacked authority to rule on Section 504 and 1983 claims); Spring Lake Park Pub. 
Schs., 110 LRP 55042 (Minn. SEA, Jul. 1, 2010) (holding that the hearing officer lacked 
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This suggests a need for careful review of the complaint to 
determine if all of the claims raised are special education 
matters under the IDEA or not and seek dismissal of those 
claims that are not. 
C. Improper Party 
Additionally, complaints are often dismissed when one of 
the parties named is done so incorrectly.  This can occur in two 
different situations: either, (1) the wrong school entity is 
named in the complaint, or (2) the person claiming to be the 
parent under the IDEA lacks standing to act as the parent. 
The first area in which these claims have been successfully 
litigated is where the LEA or school district objects to being 
listed as a party on the basis that it is not the proper defendant 
in the case.  Examples of such cases include instances where a 
school entity is a contractor for another school and, therefore, 
should not be a party to the due process hearing.29  Another 
example includes students who are in private school by 
parental choice and thus are not entitled to special education 
services from the local school district.30  Other cases involve 
claims that the IDEA considers improper when filed against 
certain agencies, including mental health agencies.31 Motions to 
dismiss have also been successful when the defendant LEA is 
undisputedly no longer the district of residence for the 
student.32 
Furthermore, such motions have been granted when the 
parent plaintiffs do not qualify as parents for purposes of the 
 
authority to rule on discrimination claims, tort claims, and constitutional claims); In 
re: Student with a Disability, 54 IDELR 240 (Va. SEA, Jan. 23, 2010) (holding the 
hearing officer lacked authority to rule on claim under McKinney-Vento Homeless 
Assistance Act); Waynesville R-VI Sch. Dist., (Mo SEA, Mar. 2008) (finding the hearing 
officer had no authority to rule on school district personnel matters); L.M. v. Lower 
Merion Sch. Dist.,  2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1999 (finding the hearing officer properly 
refused to hear claim related to racial discrimination); In re: Student with a Disability, 
111 LRP 50818 (Va. SEA, May 16, 2011) (finding the hearing officer lacked jurisdiction 
over state court order related to juvenile proceeding). 
 29  Los Angeles Cnty. Office of Educ., 111 LRP 21575 (Cal. SEA, Mar. 16, 2011); 
Wallingford-Swarthmore Sch. Dist. 110 LRP 40290 (Pa. SEA, Apr. 13, 2010). 
 30  Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 241 F. Supp. 2d 111 (D.N.H. 2003). 
 31  A.W. v. Marlborough Co. and Portland Healthcare, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D. 
Conn. 1998). 
 32  In re: Student with a Disability, 111 LRP 74582 (N.Y. SEA, Aug. 28, 2010); 
Fairhaven Pub. Sch & Acushnet Pub. Sch., 110 LRP 43882 (Mass. SEA, Jul. 16, 2010). 
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IDEA.33  Oftentimes the parent no longer has standing to act 
on the student-child’s behalf once the student-child turns 
eighteen.34  Another example of this is a student who graduates 
or moves out of the district and who is no longer entitled to a 
FAPE from the district.35 
D. Demur 
There are also cases where demur has been successfully 
used to get a complaint dismissed where the plaintiff has failed 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Such an 
approach, similar to a Rule 12(b)(6)36 motion in federal court, 
presumes the facts in the complaint to be true, and allows for 
the dismissal of the complaint if it fails to state claim on that 
basis. While this type of approach overlaps, to some extent, 
with the concept of a sufficiency challenge, it is primarily used 
to address complaints that allege sufficient facts, but fail to 
state a viable claim for relief even if those facts are true.37 This 
approach of demur has rarely been used in the context of 
special education complaints at the administrative level. 
However, this approach should be permitted and has been 
found to be permissible in at least two decisions. 
One such case is the case of T.S. v. Independent School 
District No. 54, where the student at issue graduated from high 
school and, thus, was no longer entitled to a FAPE.38  The 
allegations in the complaint were procedural in nature, 
namely, the failure to provide notice of the student’s 
graduation or hold an exit meeting.39 The court explained that, 
since the only allegations in the complaint were procedural and 
no harm was alleged to the student, the parents failed to state 
 
 33  See Loch v. Edwardsville Sch. Dist. No. 7, 327 Fed. Appx. 647 (7th Cir. 2009); 
Norwalk City Sch. Dist., 111 LRP 50530 (Ohio SEA, Jun. 17, 2011); In re: Student with 
a Disability, 111 LRP 50818; Lincoln Sudbury Pub. Sch., 110 LRP 73205 (Mass. SEA, 
Nov. 29, 2010). 
 34  See Loch, 327 Fed. Appx. 647; Norwalk City Sch. Dist., 111 LRP 50530; In re: 
Student with a Disability, 111 LRP 50818; Lincoln Sudbury Pub. Sch., 110 LRP 73205. 
 35  T.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 54, 265 F.3d 1090, 1092 (10th Cir. 2001); Smith 
v. Special Sch. Dist., No. 1, 184 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 36  Fed R. Civ.P. 12(b)(6). 
 37  See T.S., 265 F.3d at 1090; Interboro Sch. Dist., 109 LRP 56717 (Pa. SEA, 
Jun. 9, 2009). 
 38 T.S., 265 F.3d at 1092. 
 39  Id. at 1093. 
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a claim upon which relief could be granted.40 The reviewing 
federal court found that the hearing officer acted properly in 
rejecting the request for a due process hearing.41 
Another example of this approach is found in Interboro 
School District42, where a parent sought to amend the 
complaint to add allegations of student-on-student harassment 
under Section 504.43  Following an opportunity for a resolution 
session on the new claim, the school district filed a motion to 
dismiss. The district stated that even if the alleged facts in the 
amended complaint and as explained at the resolution session 
were true, the parents failed to state a valid claim for student-
on-student harassment.44 The hearing officer agreed and 
dismissed the amended complaint without a hearing.45 
E. Undue Delay 
There are several cases in which hearing officers have 
dismissed due process hearing requests because the parents 
have failed to timely pursue the hearing request or have 
repeatedly delayed the process.46 In many of these cases, the 
hearing officer considers the efforts made and the lack of 
response from the parent.47 The parents are typically advised 
that they must take some action in order to move the hearing 
process forward, including exchanging documents with 
opposing counsel or appearing at a hearing, but then fail to do 
so.48  Hearing officers who have dismissed a complaint on this 
basis typically do so on the basis that the IDEA anticipates a 
 
 40  Id. at 1095. 
 41  Id. at 1096. 
 42  Interboro Sch. Dist., 109 LRP 56717. 
 43  Id. at n. 1. It is noted that in Pennsylvania Section 504 claims can be heard 
by hearing officers who also hear IDEA claims.  See 22 PA. CODE § 15.8(d) (1991). 
 44  Interboro Sch. Dist., 109 LRP 56717. 
 45  Id. 
 46  See Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., State of Wis. Div. of Hearings and Appeals 
No. LEA-00-016 (Wis. SEA, 2000); Philbin v. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals, No. 09-
cv-30101-FDS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27699 (D. Mass. Jan. 6, 2010); Albuquerque Pub. 
Sch., N.M. Pub. Educ. Dept. No. DPH 0809-28 (N.H. SEA, Aug. 2009); Taunton Pub. 
Sch., 111 LRP 18231 (Mass. SEA, Mar. 8, 2011); In re: Student with a Disability, 55 
IDELR 89 (Va. SEA, Jun. 3, 2010); Distrist of Columbia, 111 LRP 18430 (DC SEA, Feb. 
2, 2010). 
 47  See Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., State of Wis. Div. of Hearings and Appeals 
No. LEA-00-016 (Wis. SEA, 2000); In re: Student with a Disability, 55 IDELR 89. 
 48  Albuquerque Pub. Sch., N.M. Public Education Dept. No. DPH 0809-28 (N.H. 
SEA, Aug. 2009); Taunton Pub. Schs., 111 LRP 18231; In re: Student with a Disability, 
55 IDELR 89; District of Columbia, 111 LRP 18430. 
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process that will lead to swift resolution of matters.49 
Accordingly, motions can be an effective way to dispose of cases 
in which parents fail to prosecute their case. 
F. Mootness 
Finally, there are several cases that have been dismissed 
without a hearing where the claims asserted in the complaint 
have become moot. Dismissal in such instances is typically due 
to the passage of time or an uncontested change in facts.  One 
common example is where a parent makes a demand in the 
complaint and the district has unquestionably agreed to the 
demand.50  Another common example is where the only relief 
sought is a change to the current IEP or program. Therefore, 
when the student graduates from high school, the request is 
moot.51  While admittedly dismissal for mootness is less 
common because most parties will usually voluntarily 
withdraw under such circumstances, these cases demonstrate 
that school districts have the ability to seek dismissal of the 
complaint when an issue become moot, if the parents will not 
withdraw the complaint voluntarily. 
There are a number of cases in which hearing officers have 
approved the use of pre-hearing motions to dispose of cases 
under the IDEA.  It is submitted that such an approach is 
permissible under the IDEA and its use should be expanded, 
especially in the uncommon approach of seeking a demur to the 
complaint. 
IV. CASES IN WHICH DISMISSAL HAS BEEN FOUND 
INAPPROPRIATE HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO THE FACTS OF THE 
SPECIFIC CASE – NOT ON THE BASIS OF A BROADER FINDING 
THAT SUCH AN APPROACH IS PER SE IMPERMISSIBLE UNDER THE 
IDEA. 
Several courts and hearing officers have noted concerns 
about the approach of dismissing cases prior to holding a 
hearing, especially in light of the IDEA’s explicit command that 
 
 49  See Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., State of Wis. Div. of Hearings and Appeals 
No. LEA-00-016 (Wis. SEA, 2000). 
 50  Worcester Cnty. Pub. Sch., 111 LRP 57189 (Md. SEA, July 7, 2010); Los 
Angeles Cnty. Office of Educ., 111 LRP 21575. 
 51  Stamford Bd. of Educ., 111 LRP 5946 (Conn. SEA, Sept. 23, 2010). 
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such hearings should be held.52 They did not, however, address 
the permissibility of prehearing dismissals of claims in a 
general sense. In other words, there is no case law that rejects 
the idea that of prehearing dismissals wholesale; rather, such 
decisions found dismissal improper because of the specific facts 
and circumstances at issue. 
“When [a due process] complaint is filed, the IDEA 
unambiguously states that, ‘the parents involved in such a 
complaint shall have an opportunity for an impartial due 
process hearing, which shall be conducted by the State 
educational agency.”53 Therefore, the IDEA would appear to 
provide a right for a hearing.54 Several courts have expressed 
grave concerns about practices and procedures, including 
prehearing dismissal of complaints, which block the ability of 
the parents to obtain a hearing, although no court has said 
such an approach violates the IDEA.55 When opposing an effort 
to dismiss a case without a hearing, it is often argued, pointing 
to the cases that express this concern, that such an approach is 
impermissible under the IDEA. However, a closer view of the 
cases where dismissal has been found improper reveals that 
such findings are predicated upon the fact-intensive 
circumstances of the case and not a general finding that due 
process hearings must be held in all cases.  Accordingly, 
several courts have reversed findings that have dismissed cases 
without a hearing because the substantive reasons for 
dismissal were improper. Notably, the courts remained silent 
on the broader question of whether the hearing officer was 
required to have a hearing if the substantive findings of the 
hearing officer had been correct.56  For example, in Cocores v. 
Portsmouth New Hampshire School District,57 the court 
determined that the hearing officer improperly found that a 
 
 52   See Zirkel, supra, note 7; Hazelton Area Sch. Dist., 102 LRP 1948 (Pa. SEA, 
Aug. 23, 2001). 
 53  Alexander R. v. Brookline Sch. Dist., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83481, at *7 
(emphasis added) (quoting 20 U.S.C. §1415(f)(1)). 
 54  Id.; see also Patsel v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., 522 F. Supp. 535 (D.D.C. 1981); 
Philbin, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27699; Hunt v. Bartman, 873 F. Supp. 229 (W.D. Mo. 
1994); Hazelton Area Sch. Dist., 102 LRP 1948. 
 55  Id. 
 56  See Cocores v. Portsmouth, N.H., Sch. Dist., 779 F. Supp. 203 (D.N.H. 1991) 
(finding the hearing officer improperly dismissed claim of student who was over 
twenty-one for claims she was denied a FAPE before she reached age twenty-one based 
upon the substantive law, but not upon the basis that a hearing was required). 
 57  Id. 
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student over the age of twenty-one did not have standing to 
bring claims related to the student’s education prior to age 
twenty-one without a hearing. Importantly, the court did not 
address the issue of whether it is improper to consider such a 
question without holding a hearing.58 
Another example is a series of cases, prior to the 
amendment of the IDEA, in which hearings officers found they 
did not have the legal authority to award tuition 
reimbursement and thus denied the request for a hearing.  
However, a number of courts found that parents could request 
tuition reimbursement under the IDEA and found such claims 
should be heard by hearing officers.59 In other cases, the issues 
raised in the complaint related to alleged non-compliance with 
a settlement agreement; the hearing officer ultimately found 
that it is not in his or her jurisdiction to hear such a claim.60 
Whether a hearing officer has the authority to enforce a 
settlement agreement is, as of yet, an issue not fully decided by 
the courts.61 In several cases, courts have found that the 
hearing officer was incorrect in determining that he or she did 
not have the jurisdiction to hear such claims therefore 
dismissal was improper.62 
Finally, a number of other cases have found the prehearing 
dismissal of a complaint improper because the hearing officer 
based his decision to dismiss on improper legal grounds. In 
Lyons v. Lower Merion School District,63 the hearing officer 
dismissed the complaint on the basis that she lacked authority 
to award an Independent Educational Evaluation at public 
expense and could not enforce a resolution agreement.64  
However, the court found that the hearing officer made a legal 
error in her analysis and did in fact have the authority to 
 
 58  Id. 
 59  See, e.g., S-1 v. Spangler, 832 F.2d 294, 296 (4th Cir. 1987). 
 60  Lyons v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 09-5576, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
142268, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2010); I.K. v. School Dist. of Haverford Twp., No. 10-
4397, 2011 WL 1042311 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2011); Steward v. Hillsboro Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
No. CV 00-835-AS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9887, at *4 (D. Or. Mar. 1, 2001). 
 61  Lyons, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 142268, at *8; I.K., 2011 WL 1042311; see also note 
27 above and accompanying text discussing cases where it has been found that hearing 
officers lack jurisdiction to hear such claims. 
 62  Lyons, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 142268; I.K., 2011 WL 1042311; Steward, 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 9887, at *11–*12. 
 63  Lyons, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142268. 
 64  Id. at *3. 
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address both issues.65  In Philbin v. Bureau of Special 
Education Appeals,66 the reviewing court found the dismissal of 
parents’ due process complaint for want of prosecution to be 
improper. The court reached this conclusion because the 
hearing officer acted improperly in his application of rules 
related to scheduling created by the state.67 In Patsel v. District 
of Columbia Board. of Education68 and Hunt v. Bartman,69 
hearing officers in both cases dismissed complaints as not yet 
ripe, noting that the school district had not finalized the 
placement decision for the student.70 However, in both cases, 
the reviewing court found that the hearing officer’s findings 
were based upon incorrect findings of fact.71 
In sum, while a number of cases have found that 
prehearing dismissals of due process complaints were 
improper, the results of those cases were based upon a legal or 
factual error of the hearing officer. It was these errors that 
forced the conclusion of improper dismissal, not that the IDEA 
mandates a hearing in all cases. To the contrary, there is 
abundance of case law in which a prehearing dismissal was 
found to be proper. Moreover, the need for judicial economy 
undercuts any suggestion that a hearing must be held in every 
case. This is true even in cases where a hearing officer does not 
have jurisdiction or the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient 
to support the claim. While there exist cases in which a hearing 
was found to be necessary, such findings appear to be limited to 
the specific facts of those cases rather than some broader rule. 
V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION: USE OF PRE-HEARING 
DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS UNDER THE IDEA SHOULD BE EXPANDED 
Unless state rules provide otherwise, there appears to be a 
lot of room for creativity in filing of prehearing motions to 
dismiss due process complaints in some circumstances. The 
 
 65  Id. at *7–*11.  It is important to note that the court did directly address the 
issue of the ability of the hearing officer to rule on the resolution agreement, but rather 
found the parents did not really ask the hearing officer to enforce the same and instead 
were seeking due process to obtain an IEE at public expense. 
 66  Philbin, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27699. 
 67  Id. at *17. 
 68  Patsel., 522 F. Supp. 535. 
 69  Hunt, 873 F. Supp. 229. 
 70  Hunt, 873 F. Supp. at 238; see also Patsel, 522 F. Supp. at 539. 
 71  Hunt, 873 F. Supp. at 243; see also Patsel, 522 F. Supp. at 539–40. 
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ability to file such motions depends largely on what the filing 
party alleges in the complaint, which suggests a need for 
careful pleading by the filing party. While the IDEA appears to 
require a hearing, it is clear that under some circumstances it 
may be possible to avoid one by filing an appropriate motion 
early in the case.  In certain cases, such motions may avoid the 
expense and effort required by a full hearing or, at the very 
least, narrowing the issues for the hearing. Prehearing motions 
could also serve to cut down the length of the hearing, saving 
time and money. 
It is important to note that the number of hearings that 
hearing officers are being asked to handle is increasing, 
suggesting a need for a more efficient means of resolving these 
matters.72  An increase in the use of the aforementioned 
procedures of dismissal would be an effective and appropriate 
means to reduce the number of cases going to hearing early in 
the process.  One approach would be for parties to be more 
proactive about motions practice in this area of the law, or for 
states that do not already have such a procedure in place to 
provide a procedure for dispositive motions through the 
regulations related to special education due process hearings.  
Accordingly, the use of pre-hearing motions is permissible 




 72  See, e.g., 2010 IDEA PART B INDICATOR ANALYSIS at 171 (Aug. 2010); Special 
Education Today (Dec. 17, 2010). 
